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FINANCIAL STABILITY ANDNATIONAL SECURITY
IN AN ERA OFHEGEMONICRIVALRY: THENEED





Defending national security will become increasingly interconnected
with developing, controlling and exploiting technological innovation, as
well as preserving domestic financial stability and core economic strength.
Sovereigns are empowered through shareholding to control corporations,
and thus “conquer,” or substantially influence and control another
sovereign’s political governance, industrial strength and economic future.
Obtaining economic leverage and technological prowess over an adversary
through share accumulation and share voting provides a compellingly
attractive alternative (with a potential benefit of profiting from such
leverage and supremacy) to open military confrontation and the associated
costs and risk of loss.
Nations will need to evaluate these concerns and determine whether
share ownership by foreign governments poses national security risks
warranting a re-evaluation of shareholding regulation. While foreign
investment review procedures such as the United States’ CFIUS can serve
as important vetting mechanisms, such regimes are focused on large
transactions; share purchases will generally not be on the radar. Therefore,
securities regulation should be updated to reflect the transformational
developments in emerging technology and threats to financial stability,
both directly and indirectly implicating national security concerns,
particularly in the context of the hegemonic rivalry. Some have advocated
for strictly limiting or outright banning Chinese investment in the United
States. Rather than draconian bans on sovereign investing, foreign
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governmental entities purchasing shares should be more strictly monitored
to ensure core economic sectors and emergent technology are protected.
Legitimate governmental investors should not object to heightened
disclosure and reporting requirements.
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“[O]nce upon a time securities regulation was entirely separate from
banking supervision and financial stability. . . . Securities regulation must
now be in the front line of efforts to preserve the stability of the financial
system.”
1
“American stock exchanges have emerged as the latest battleground
in the ongoing political fight between the U.S. and China.”
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The December 2018 arrest of a Huawei executive in Canada at the
request of the United States
3
, the retaliatory invocation of national security
1. PAUL TUCKER ET AL., CHALLENGES IN SECURITIESMARKETS REGULATION: INVESTOR
PROTECTION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7, 23 (Pablo Gasós, Ernest Gnan & Morten
Balling eds., 2015), http://www.suerf.org/docx/s_1ae [https://perma.cc/J77Z-KBGM].
2. Akiko Fujita & Krystal Hu, New Bipartisan Bills Threaten Chinese IPOs and
Chinese Companies Listed in the U.S., YAHOO FIN. (June 8, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.co
m/news/bipartisan-bills-threaten-chinese-companies-listed-in-us-000758485.html [https://p
erma.cc/6PKG-L4YM].
3. See Kate Conger, Huawei Executive Granted Bail by Canadian Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/technology/huawei-executive-canada
-bail-decision.html [https://perma.cc/NW44-BX4U] (detailing how the CFO was arrested at
the behest of American authorities for potentially deceiving financial institutions into
violating sanctions against Iran); see also Kiran Stacey & Tom Mitchell, US Unveils
Criminal Charges Against Huawei, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/f
f000e70-233c-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf [https://perma.cc/SC56-U4LT] (“The US has
accused China’s Huawei and its chief financial officer of stealing American technology and
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by China to arrest two Canadians
4
, and the increasingly contentious
relationship between China and the United States
5
highlight the
transformative age of hegemonic rivalry. As former Australian PM Rudd
noted: “Last year [2018] represented a fundamental strategic turning point
in the 40-year history of US-China relations. This is not just an American
view; it is also the Chinese view.”
6
Following several decades of stable relations, the United States has
radically transformed its perception of Chinese ambitions. No longer does
the United States view China as being on the path to inevitably granting
Westernized notions of rights to its citizens and embracing the U.S.-led
liberal Western order. The United States now perceives China as a
strategic rival for global dominance and has increasingly publicly accused
China of debt trapping nations, warned countries about China’s 5G, alleged
Chinese election interference and criticized China’s increased projection of
breaking US sanctions against Iran, in a criminal indictment that sharply escalates the two
countries’ technological rivalry.”).
4. See Joel Gherke, Mike Pompeo: China’s ‘Unlawful Detention of Two Canadian
Citizens Is Unacceptable,’WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonexam
iner.com/policy/defense-national-security/mike-pompeo-chinas-unlawful-detention-of-two-
canadian-citizens-is-unacceptable [https://perma.cc/S8NF-UX7J] (“China detained two
Canadian diplomats—one businessman, another a former diplomat—just days after Canada
arrested a top executive from Huawei, a major technology company that the U.S.
government accuses of violating sanctions on Iran. The detentions are widely regarded as
Chinese retaliation against Canada, but officials on all sides maintain that none of the arrests
have anything to do with political motivations.”).
5. See Dominic Rushe & Lily Kuo, China Accuses US of ‘Deliberately Destroying’
World Order, GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2019, 4:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2
019/aug/05/us-designates-china-as-currency-manipulator [https://perma.cc/66ZW-JRML]
(“Today some in America are obsessed with American privilege to the point of destroying
international rules and the international system. . . .”); see also Wu Junhua, Taking Sides --
US or China, NIKKEIASIAN REV. (Oct. 15, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinio
n/Taking-sides-US-or-China [https://perma.cc/MTA8-JR87] (“The deterioration of the U.S.-
China relationship has now gone far beyond what we can call a trade war. U.S. President
Donald Trump and his administration have expanded the rivalry from an economic battle to
all-out confrontation with Beijing over military and even ideological fields.”).
6. Kevin Rudd, Kevin Rudd on US-China Relations: This Is a New and Dangerous
Phase, FIN. REV. (Jan. 23, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://www.afr.com/opinion/kevin-rudd-on-
uschina-relations-this-is-a-new-and-dangerous-phase-20190122-h1acu6. [https://perma.cc/N
8T9-YDQJ] To be sure, the tension started 2018. See, e.g., Bien Perez, ZTE to Pay Record
US$1.2 Billion Fine for Violating Iran, North Korea Sanctions, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (Mar. 8, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/tech/china-tech/article/2076867/chin
as-zte-pay-record-us12bn-fine-violating-iran-north-korea [https://perma.cc/8VKD-YYGG]
(“ZTE Corp, China’s largest listed telecommunications equipment supplier, has agreed to
pay the United States government a record fine to settle a five-year probe of its trade
sanctions violations, in a move to lift the ban on US exports of chips and components for its
products.”).
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military power in the South China Seas.
7
The contest for supremacy—and
associated national security concerns—have already impacted several key
economic pillars of global governance and international economic law:
trade and foreign direct investment.
Historically, national security had little to no connection to publicly
traded capital markets or financial regulation, focusing instead on classic
military attack and conquest. Today however, pure military capability has
been trumped by the importance of non-military stratagems capable of
degrading, weakening and vanquishing (virtually or ultimately physically)
a strategic adversary.
8
Our interconnected global economy with cross-
border investment makes open military conflict a less palatable option,
given the potential economic losses which would accrue to a victorious
state arising from a counter-attack or being “invested” in that strategic
adversary.
From an economic standpoint, raw economic strength is in itself one
of the three vital pillars of hegemony.
9
As a corollary, financial stability is
a vital national security interest to ensure a continued robust economy and
domestic social order.
[T]he financial sector is one of the bedrocks of the U.S.—and
global—economy. Significant disruptive or destructive attacks
against the financial sector could have catastrophic effects on the
economy and threaten financial stability. This could occur
directly through lost revenue as well as indirectly through losses
in consumer confidence and effects that reverberate beyond the
financial sector because it serves as the backbone of other parts
of the economy.
10
7. See Keith Johnson & Elias Groll, It’s No Longer Just a Trade War Between the U.S.
and China, FOREIGNPOL’Y (Oct. 4, 2018, 6:10 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/04/its-no
-longer-just-a-trade-war-with-china-pence-spying/ [https://perma.cc/F7KE-6MYS] (“The
U.S. confrontation with China that has been ramping up over the past year due to heightened
trade tensions, military showdowns, and diplomatic ill will escalated to new levels on
Thursday with a double-barreled assault on Beijing’s growing economic and geopolitical
heft.”).
8. The fact that both the United States and China have nuclear weapons makes open
military conflict a potentially lose-lose situation for both nations, further encouraging
economic and technological supremacy as an alternative arena, at least in the short-term.
However, certain red-line issues may risk causing (even by miscalculating the opponent’s
resolve) conventional conflict with unforeseeable outcomes.
9. See Joel Slawotsky, The National Security Exception in US-China FDI and Trade:
Lessons from Delaware Corporate Law, 6 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 228, 241–45 (2018) (noting
economic, technological and military power as the triad of hegemonic status).
10. Erica Borghard, Protecting Financial Institutions Against Cyber Threats: A
National Security Issue, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Sept. 24, 2018), https://c
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However, the financial health of capital markets is not only a national
security interest of the United States. China understands the importance of
capital markets in the hegemonic rivalry.
In this sense, we should attach importance to the mutual
influence of trade disputes and financial markets so as to achieve
the following targets: to minimize the impact of trade disputes on
China’s financial market, to contain any harm to the rival’s side
in the trade war, and to prevent the opponent from using the
trade war to manipulate and attack the domestic financial
market.
11
In the context of the hegemonic rivalry, financial stability is
recognized as a vital factor by both China and the United States as
materially contributing to crowning the ultimately successful winner.
Threats to domestic financial markets are the quintessential national
security risk, and in an integrated financial world, a serious risk to the
global financial order as well.
12
As national security factors have proximately caused trade and
investment to be impacted, not surprisingly, literature has recently
developed addressing national security in the context of tariffs and foreign
direct investment. However, an overlooked sub-topic within the rubric of
security implications of foreign direct investment is the inextricable link
between national security and publicly traded shares. This paper will focus
on the interrelationship between national security and capital markets in an
era of hegemonic rivalry.
Some have argued for high-impact actions to curtail access to U.S.
capital markets. Such measures “discussed have included forcing a
delisting of Chinese companies from US exchanges, imposing limits on
investments in Chinese markets by US government pension funds and
putting caps on the value of Chinese companies included in indexes




11. Mei Xinyu, Financial Defense Important in US-China Trade War, GLOBAL TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2019, 6:18 PM), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1161201.shtml [https://perma.
cc/D6HR-DPSE] (emphasis added).
12. See Borghard, supra note 10 (“In turn, the outsized role the United States plays in
the global economy also implies that the stability and integrity of U.S. financial sector firms
are critical to global financial stability.”).
13. See Bloomberg, Bridgewater Associates’ Ray Dalio Outlines Path Trump Could
Take to Limit US Capital Flows to China, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 2, 2019,
10:28 AM), https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/3031181/bridgewater-as
sociates-ray-dalio-outlines-path-trump-could [https://perma.cc/U39R-Q2UY] (documenting
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As will be discussed infra, legitimate concerns exist with respect to
Chinese investors. However, draconian measures
14
risk not merely
retaliatory moves, but will remove potential capital investment and will set
a transformative precedent. Securities regulation must be updated in view
of the current national security implications of the hegemonic rivalry. The
updates—crucial in the context of a transformative world—should allow
for and in fact encourage cross-border investment. United States securities
regulation must play a vital role in defending national security, which
includes financial stability, and be sufficiently balanced to continue to
serve its function of enabling a prosperous domestic economy. As
discussed infra, tightening the disclosure requirements for government-
linked buyers strikes a healthy balance between the two compelling needs:
national security and economic prosperity.
II. THEHEGEMONICRIVALRY
Hegemons are perched on top of the pyramid—the alpha nation—
dominating all other rivals economically, militarily and technologically,
15
and are empowered to enforce the global order to promote the hegemon’s
interests. Substantial advantages accrue to the hegemon in the international
economic and legal orders. For example, the current hegemon, the United
States, has exceptional authority to advance American interests
extraterritorially.
16
how fund manager Dalio foresees the possibility of “capital and currency wars, the ability of
the US president to unilaterally cut off capital flows to China and also freeze payments on
the debts owed to China, and also use sanctions to inhibit non-American financial
transactions with China must be considered as possibilities.”).
14. See Alan Rappaport & Ana Swanson, White House Weighs Blocking Chinese
Companies from U.S. Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/20
19/09/27/us/politics/trump-china-stock-exchange.html [https://perma.cc/RY7K-CS7P]
(measuring the pros and cons of limiting Chinese access to U.S. markets); see also Kayla
Tausche, White House Floated Memo to Study Chinese Investment Limits, CNBC (Oct. 1,
2019, 12:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/01/white-house-floated-memo-to-study-c
hina-investment-limits-amid-trade-war.html [https://perma.cc/RK4C-YZHS] (reporting that
the U.S. is considering restricting Chinese investment, delisting Chinese shares traded in the
U.S. and other measures).
15. See Slawotsky, supra note 9, at 241–45 (noting the triad of hegemonic pillars of
power: economic, military and technological).
16. The hegemon “dictates the rules of the game and punishes deviators.” O.F.
Bahrisch & Jin-Suk Kim, Hegemonic Power and Technology Advancement, 261 COMM.
COMPUTER & INFO. SCI. 562, 563 (2011). For example, no other sovereign was able to
successfully overcome Swiss bank secrecy. See Robert A. Wood, 10 Facts About FATCA,
America’s Manifest Destiny Law Changing Banking Worldwide, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2014,
2:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/08/19/ten-facts-about-fatca-ameri
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China, a rival power, is challenging the existing hegemon.
17
This
long-term contest for global leadership will ultimately affect all pillars of
the transnational governance architecture: trade rules, cross-border
investment policy, international financial institutions, international law,
geo-strategic alliances, military inflection points and domestic
governance.
18
The ultimately successful contestant will dominate each
pillar of hegemonic power: (1) enjoying the strongest economy with the
ability to shape and create trade rules and international finance; (2) a
powerful military vested with cutting edge weapons and the ability to
project that power globally to protect its national interests; and (3)
supremacy in emerging technologies which can bolster tremendously the
hegemon’s domestic economy, as well as create devastating weapons that
can crush or degrade an adversary.
The United States did not perceive a threat from China in recent
decades, indeed encouraging its entry into the WTO in 2001.
19
However,
the United States now perceives China as a competing economic and
political model—a powerful strategic enemy—within grasp of dominating
Asia and potentially re-shaping the global governance architecture. The
radical transformation of the United States’ perceptions of China is
illustrated in the vast differences between contemporary National Security
Strategy documents. As recently as 2002, the United States National
casmanifest-destiny-law-changing-banking-worldwide/#300593551961
[https://perma.cc/3W7B-CSG7] (noting the ability of the United States to essentially
override domestic laws of foreign nations). The example of Swiss banking is illustrative.
As recently as 2005, Swiss banking was considered a safe place to stash money
anonymously. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE BROKER 311 (2006) (noting the inviolably of Swiss
banking secrecy, “the Swiss were immune to pressure [from foreign governments] . . . they
were the Swiss!”). Yet, only a few years later, the ability of the United States to enforce its
taxation system on foreign financial institutions and pressurize the Swiss banks to disclose
the names of account holders eliminated this anonymity. See also Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Announces Four Banks Reach
Resolutions Under Swiss Bank Program (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ju
stice-department-announces-four-banks-reach-resolutions-under-swiss-bank-program-0
[https://perma.cc/7U6X-MQ5N] (illustrating the enforced transparency Swiss banks were
demonstrating due to the penalties they were administered by the U.S.).
17. See infra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
18. See Joel Slawotsky, The Clash of Architects: Impending Developments and
Transformations in International Law, 3 CHINESE J. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 83
(2017), https://doi.org/10.1163/23525207-12340025 [https://perma.cc/JE7N-MC8R]
(discussing the effects of China’s ascendancy and how this will affect international law and
global governance, as well as potentially impacting domestic governance of sovereigns
militating towards a Chinese governance model).
19. Joseph Kahn, World Trade Organization Admits China, Amid Doubts, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/11/world/world-trade-organization-adm
its-china-amid-doubts.html.
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Security Strategy non-confrontationally noted: “In time, China will find
that social and political freedom is the only source of [national]
greatness.”
20
And the 2006 United States National Security Strategy
opined in the context of optimism: “China’s leaders . . . cannot let their
population increasingly experience the freedoms to buy, sell, and produce,
while denying them the rights to assemble, speak, and worship.”
21
Barely a decade later, the 2017 United States National Security
Strategy clearly evinces a transformational re-characterization of China and
the realization that the hoped-for results of economic engagement and
integration
22
have failed to materialize. “China and Russia want to shape a
world antithetical to U.S. values and interests . . . China seeks to displace
the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-
driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.”
23
2018 will be recalled as the year the rivalry was acknowledged and the
gauntlet was thrown down. An exemplar of this new thinking is the
statement of U.S. Vice President Pence:
China’s aggression was on display this week, when a Chinese
naval vessel came within 45 yards of the USS Decatur as it
conducted freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China
Sea, forcing our ship to quickly maneuver to avoid collision.
Despite such reckless harassment, the United States Navy will
continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows and our national interests demand. We will not be
intimidated and we will not stand down. . . . [O]ur message to
China’s rulers is this: This President will not back down.
24
The perception that China is a bona fide threat to U.S. hegemony is
not without a rational basis. Indeed, for the first time in eighty years, the
20. Joel Slawotsky, Principled Realism: Thoughts on the New U.S. National Security
Strategy, L. END DAY (Jan. 11, 2018), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/joel-
slawotsky-principled-realism.html [https://perma.cc/LYQ9-J4VS].
21. Id. (citing THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OFAMERICA 25 (2017)) (emphasis added).
22. A counter-argument states that U.S. strategy was in reality an effort at containment.
See Larry Catá Backer, Encircling China or Embedding It?, L. END DAY (Nov. 8, 2010), htt
p://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/encircling-china.html [https://perma.cc/4HUF-P5K
D] (noting Chinese concerns that United States policy was aimed at containing a rising
China).
23. Slawotsky, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
24. Michael Pence, Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy
Toward China, WHITEHOUSE (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-stateme
nts/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/ [https://perma.cc/P5
LM-4T6P] (emphasis added).
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United States is being effectively challenged.
25
“From the South China Sea
to the Indian Ocean and the African Continent, China is rising fast,
challenging America’s long dominance.”
26
The possibility of hegemonic loss is now recognized by the existing
hegemon, which merely a few years ago considered itself untouchable and
unequalled.
27
American officials now believe that “[n]o country presents a
broader, more severe threat to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic
security than China.”
28
China concedes it is now a great power and has global ambitions of
leadership in the geo-strategic context. President Xi acknowledges that
China’s rise has immense global implications. “China should take the lead
in shaping the ‘new world order’ and safeguarding international
security.”
29
China’s leader has called for “a regional order that is more
favorable to Asia and the world,” noting that China “[b]eing a big country
means shouldering greater responsibilities for regional and world peace and
development.”
30
Some argue that, similar to prior hegemonic contenders who failed to
dethrone the United States, China will also fail. But comparisons to prior
rivals such as the Soviet Union are misplaced. In contrast to prior
25. See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (comparing the Soviet Union as a
rival to the United States).
26. Panos Mourdoukoutas, America Begins to See the Consequences of the Past Policy
Errors that Helped China’s Rise, FORBES (May 25, 2019, 2:32 PM), https://www.forbes.co
m/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2019/05/25/america-begins-to-see-the-consequences-of-the-pa
st-policy-errors-that-helped-chinas-rise/#21a98cec7981 [https://perma.cc/QG6H-A68X].
27. Just a few years ago, the United States perceived itself as the exceptional nation.
See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy
Commencement Ceremony, WHITE HOUSE (May 28, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the
-pressoffice/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academycommencementce
remony [https://perma.cc/9D3V-9E2G] (“In fact, by most measures, America has rarely
been stronger relative to the rest of the world. . . . Our military has no peer. . . . Meanwhile,
our economy remains the most dynamic on Earth; our businesses the most innovative. Each
year, we grow more energy independent. From Europe to Asia, we are the hub of alliances
unrivaled in the history of nations. America continues to attract striving immigrants. . . .
So[,] the United States is and remains the one indispensable nation. That has been true for
the century passed and it will be true for the century to come.”) (emphasis added).
28. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Jeff Session’s China
Initiative Fact Sheet (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1107256/down
load [https://perma.cc/7KCN-C4K9].
29. Zheping Huang, Chinese President Xi Jinping Has Vowed to Lead the “New World
Order”, YAHOO FIN. (Feb. 22, 2017), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/chinese-president-xi-ji
nping-vowed-084654413.htm. [https://perma.cc/GQ7N-YRSP]
30. Michael Schuman, Whose Money Will the World Follow?, BLOOMBERG (May 14,
2015, 3:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-14/u-s-china-rivalry-w
hose-money-will-the-world-follow- [https://perma.cc/34N8-W6VA].
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opponents, China has masterfully integrated into the global governance
architecture. China wields the world’s second largest economy, has
established the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (“AIIB”), and is a
leader in the New Development Bank (“NDB”)—both potential alternative
(and longer-term competitors) to the IMF and World Bank. China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) is a mammoth infrastructure program which, if
successful, will have immense geo-strategic potential.
31
Indeed, China is
astutely building a Chinese court system to resolve BRI-related disputes,
potentially enabling China to influence commercial law development and
become a rules-maker.
32
China’s military is becoming more powerful, and
its technological innovation is starting to rival the United States. China is,
at various points, crossing the Rubicon to hegemonic status and has
brought the prospect of a reduced role for the United States to a credible
possibility.
The contrast between China and the Soviet Union is herculean: the
former Soviet Union never had a robust economy, never established
competing international governance institutions, and no one thought of the
Ruble as a major currency, let alone a world reserve currency. The Soviets
were on the outside looking in and attacked U.S. hegemony via supporting
revolutionary groups, failed states and rogue regimes. In contrast, China
wields the second-largest global economy by nominal GDP, is an integral
part of the international trade order, has significant global governance
initiatives such as the AIIB and the BRI, and envisions the Yuan as a
burgeoning reserve currency.
The developments described above corroborate China as a potent and
effective hegemonic rival. Unquestionably, the United States is now
planning to confront and push back China’s rise based upon threats to
national security.
33
The struggle’s present phase is an economic and
technologically based confrontation for overall superiority in the global
governance context. The rivalry is triggering national security concerns
within the United States (and to varying degrees among U.S.-allied nations)
31. See Vernan Silver & Sheridan Prasso, Italy’s Embrace of China’s ‘Belt and
Road’ Is a Snub to Washington, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.c
om/news/articles/2019-03-19/italy-s-embrace-of-china-s-belt-and-road-is-a-snub-to-washing
ton [https://perma.cc/2C8C-S2DQ] (discussing China’s potential influence in Europe).
32. Jonathan E. Hillman & Matthew P. Goodman, China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Court to
Challenge Current US-led Order, FIN. TIMES (July 24, 2018, 9:43 PM), https://www.ft.com/
content/b64d7f2e-8f4d-11e8-b639-7680cedcc421.
33. America’s New Attitude Towards China Is Changing the Countries’ Relationship,
ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/10/18/americas-new
-attitude-towards-china-is-changing-the-countries-relationship [https://perma.cc/VCV5-TV5
R].
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Therefore, national security considerations are
now a significant driver of investment and trade policy.
37
Trade friction
and investment blocking are merely the current manifestations of the
rivalry. The next Part will discuss how the hegemonic contest is likely to
encompass global capital markets.
III. NATIONAL SECURITY ANDCAPITALMARKETS
Historically, with rare exceptions, states were relegated to public
functions while the private market was the sphere of private economic
actors. However, this dichotomy has markedly changed.
38
For example,
34. See Andrea Willige, The World’s Top Economy: The US vs China in Five Charts,
WORLD ECON. F. (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-to
p-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/ [https://perma.cc/2UUW-VLRY] (explaining that
China is second in economic power, but close to surpassing the United States).
35. See an Interactive Look at the U.S.-China Military Scorecard, RAND, https://www.
rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html [https://perma.cc/93E9-BBG5] (analyzing the
significant rise in Chinese military power).
36. See ELSA B. KANIA, BATTLEFIELD SINGULARITY: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,
MILITARY REVOLUTION, AND CHINA’S FUTUREMILITARY POWER 6 (2017), https://www.cna
s.org/publications/reports/battlefield-singularity-artificial-intelligence-military-revolution-a
nd-chinas-future-military-power [https://perma.cc/V9U9-CAT9] (stating that China is
rapidly approaching parity and has ambitions for supremacy in AI-driven warfare).
37. The use of the national security rationale by the United States to impose tariffs in
2018, as well as the increasing scrutiny of Chinese foreign investment globally based upon
national security, all herald a more frequent resort to national security based international
economic law decisions. See, e.g., Presidential Order Regarding the Proposed Takeover of
Qualcomm Incorporated by Broadcom Limited, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 12, 2018), https://ww
w.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-order-regarding-proposed-takeover-qual
comm-incorporated-broadcom-limited/ [https://perma.cc/UQX9-6W5E] (“There is credible
evidence that leads me to believe that Broadcom . . . through exercising control of
Qualcomm . . . a Delaware corporation, might take action that threatens to impair the
national security of the United States. . . .”) (emphasis added).
38. The traditional sharp lines of distinction between states and corporations have
become increasingly blurred; states are becoming investors in private markets and in
parallel, private corporations are now involved in historically public functions. See Joel
Slawotsky, The Global Corporation as International Law Actor, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 79,
84 (2012); Ru Ding, ‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 J. WORLD
TRADE 167 (2014) (SOEs may contain both public and private characteristics). But see Joel
Slawotsky, Corporate Liability for Violating International Law Under the Alien Tort
Statute: The Corporation Through the Lens of Globalization and Privatization, 2013 INT’L
REV. L. 1, 17 (2013) (“To be sure, there have been prior examples of corporations wielding
state like power over private citizens. For example, the British East Indies Company [] was
a state-controlled company that was enormously influential over India and wielded both
private and public actor power.”).
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share ownership is available to international buyers, both private actors as
well as governments. The propensity of sovereigns to enter private markets
and engage in cross-border investment—including buying publicly traded
shares—is a significant dynamic with critical implications: states are
increasingly willing to project economic power abroad, and the immense
financial power of some states trumps the traditional notions of sovereign
power.
What distinguishes this sovereign activity from its mid-20th
Century form is the willingness of states not only to limit their
control of internal economies, but also to invest their financial
wealth outside their national borders. In this respect, states
assume the very role of the private economic actors that they
once feared so much. The 21st Century is witnessing a dramatic
rise in the willingness of states to project economic power both at
home and in host states through the same economic vehicles that
threatened the states’ power in the 20th Century. . . .
Consequently, some states seem to have become, to some extent,
pools of national economic wealth, the power of which matches
or exceeds their traditional sovereign power.
39
Large publicly traded corporations are powerful actors comparable
financially to nation-states and are embedded in all facets of critical
infrastructure, communications, energy, financial services, technology and
other core economic sectors. Ownership of these businesses, via share
acquisition, is available on capital markets. Control or influence over
national champions or crucial economic sectors may potentially be an
objective of government controlled buyers.
40
The connection between
national security and capital markets is manifestly clear; publicly traded
corporations are at the vanguard of technological innovation and
revolutionary financial services.
Moreover, publicly traded companies explore, drill and market
energy-critical materials and often constitute the backbone of core
industrial and financial services strength. National corporate champions,
strategic industrial assets and critical economic sectors are intertwined with
national security. “‘Strategic’ industries . . . include armaments, power
39. Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19
TRANSNAT’L L. &CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11 (2010) (emphasis added).
40. See ALAN P. LARSON&DAVIDM.MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT ANDNATIONAL
SECURITY: GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT 21 (2006) (“In certain cases, government
ownership and control can create national security issues, particularly when the foreign
company’s decisions become an extension of the government’s policy decisions rather than
the company’s commercial interests.”).
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generation and distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunications,
coal, aerospace, and airfreight. ‘Pillar’ industries . . . include[e] equipment
manufacturing, automobiles, electronic communications, architecture, steel,
nonferrous metals, chemicals, surveying and science and technology.”
41
In jurisdictions with publicly traded stock markets, dominating the
economic high-ground can thus be accomplished through significant share
ownership, which empowers the holder to exercise voting power and elect
directors. Extensive shareholdings in a sector or industry can serve to
influence or control that entire sector or industry. Significant shareholders
may also reap secondary awards, such as close communications with senior
executives and directors, visits to a corporation, and product
demonstrations which can serve as vehicles to extract valuable information.
If the shareholder is a foreign government, either directly or through
an intermediary that the government controls, owning significant stakes
potentially empowers that sovereign to shape and influence the corporation.
The ability to elect directors, direct corporate affairs and extract proprietary
information can be used to further a foreign government’s interests.
Accordingly, obtaining economic leverage and technological prowess over
an adversary through share accumulation and share voting provides a
compellingly attractive alternative (with a potential benefit of profiting
from such leverage and supremacy) to open military confrontation and the
costs and risks of loss.
Thus, the defense of the national bastion—once conceptualized as
security against military conquest—is now inextricably linked to global
trade, investment policy and corporate finance, including the control of—or
influence over—publicly traded global businesses particularly in critical
sectors such as communications, finance, energy and technology.
In the context of the hegemonic rivalry, economic superiority is a
critical factor. Economic power translates into influence as well as profits,
and leveraging economic engagement to shape global governance is crucial
to both China and the U.S. This is exemplified by China’s attempt to
engage U.S. allies, bringing them within China’s BRI and thus being allied
with Chinese financial interests. “In a move certain to cause consternation
among American officials and leaders of the European Union, Italy appears
poised to help China extend its vast global infrastructure push deeper into
Western Europe, part of Beijing’s sweeping plan to advance its economic
41. See Ding, supra note 38, at 187 (arguing that Chinese policy aims for sole
ownership and absolute state control over strategic sectors such as weapons, energy, power
generation, and communications and to have majority state ownership of “pillar” industries
such as steel, chemicals, technology, manufacturing, autos, and equipment manufacturing).
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interests and influence around the world.”
42
Along with financial stability—and inextricably linked with it—are
the national security ramifications of emergent technologies such as AI,
5G, robots and space exploration.
43
Dominating powerful emergent
technologies will likely crown the hegemonic winner for two reasons: One,
the offensive capabilities, even in the non-military context, are potentially
devastating. The power to shut down an adversary’s electricity, water, and
critical infrastructure, destabilize financial markets, interfere in elections
and cause other permutations, all offer effective and efficient paths to
virtually conquer or seriously degrade a strategic enemy.
44
Cyber-attacks
are already causing substantial damage.
45
Moreover, from a military perspective, technological supremacy could
pave the path to an overwhelming victory by: (1) infiltrating another
sovereign’s military weapons systems to shut them down; (2) deploying
twenty-four-hour fighting robot soldiers requiring no food, rest or
questioning of any directive; or (3) hacking into communications and
intelligence data.
Two, emergent technologies will result in huge new industries and
profitable sectors, greatly enriching the sovereigns that can commercialize
and exploit economically these new technologies. As an exemplar, the
WEF estimates that AI will add nearly $16 trillion to Global GDP by
2030.
46
Reaping the lions’ share of this vast, newly created wealth will be
the leaders in AI. Therefore, dominating these new powerful technologies
is critical in the context of the hegemonic rivalry for both reasons outlined
above.
42. Jason Horowitz & Jack Ewing, Italy May Split with Allies and Open Its Ports to
China’s Building Push, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/ 06/
world/europe/italy-ports-china.html [https://perma.cc/3YQW-8VU2] (noting allies such as
Italy may be tempted to partner with China).
43. See Slawotsky, supra note 9, at 233 (“[N]ational security is not only military
preparedness; national security encompasses a wide range of important bulwarks in defence
of the good of the nation such as peace, prosperity, and stability. New technology inspired
dual-use civilian/military product applications . . . increasingly cross into the realm of
legitimate national security.”).
44. Defensive capabilities will become increasingly crucial, as well.
45. See Nicole Perlroth & Scott Shane, In Baltimore and Beyond, a Stolen N.S.A. Tool
Wreaks Havoc, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-h
acking-tool-baltimore.html [https://perma.cc/7EUH-SK7S] (“For nearly three weeks,
Baltimore has struggled with a cyberattack by digital extortionists that has frozen thousands
of computers, shut down email and disrupted real estate sales, water bills, health alerts and
many other services.”).
46. Ross Chainey, The Global Economy Will Be $16 Trillion Bigger by 2030 Thanks to
AI, WORLD ECON. F. (June 27, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/the-global-
economy-will-be-14-bigger-in-2030-because-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/5KRK-BVFQ].
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In the past, concerns related to obtaining leverage over another
sovereign’s economic and technological power via controlling corporate
assets would be relatively modest to non-existent since virtually all
economic players and investors were private actors. Governments by and
large were involved in public-actor functions only. Under the private actor
system, it is the profit motive—divorced from any ideological interests or
political agenda—that controls the decision of investment. However,
governmental ownership is a transformative factor, as there is a risk that
governments will invest for reasons that are not necessarily solely for
profit.
It is crucial to understand that these challenges affect not merely the
main protagonists, but third-party nations as well. The rivalry for global
supremacy between China and the United States is a global battleground
impacting numerous states. Capital markets are inter-connected, emerging
technology is developed in numerous jurisdictions, and access to energy
resources and capital for development are available in various nations.
Therefore, both China and the United States will need to tap their allied
nations for these resources and block the other from benefitting from these
third-nations.
Exemplars are China’s attempts to bring EU nations into the BRI,
have nations use the Yuan as a means of trade settlement and induce a
potential post-Brexit United Kingdom to be economic partners. For its
part, the United States has lobbied allies to ban Huawei’s 5G, join in
freedom of navigation exercises, and exercise caution regarding Chinese
investor motivations. Therefore, other nations will also need to address the
national security implications of shareholdings held by foreign
governments.
Generally speaking, there are two primary risks proximately caused by
sovereign investment not motivated for profit: (1) national security threats
and (2) lackluster corporate governance. While described separately,
corporate governance is closely related to national security; the concerns
are overlapping because poor governance will inherently lead to less
efficiency and productivity, lackluster economic performance, and adverse
effects to financial stability—all essential aspects of national security.
A. National Security Concerns
Anxieties over foreign government controlled investors trigger
national security concerns caused by concerns that decisions are motivated
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either proximately or in part to achieve strategic governmental objectives.
47
“[H]ost countries cannot summarily assume that [foreign-government]
investments will never be guided by political objectives or that the
management of [foreign-government buyers] will never be motivated by
‘nationalistic considerations’ deviating from conventional wealth
maximization.”
48
Foreign government shareholders may wish to advance the
government’s geo-political agenda.
49
Strategic considerations such as
economic, military and political partnerships, rather than pure market
forces, may play a prominent role in business decision-making at state-
owned economic actors.
50
Even among allies, national security concerns are raised by foreign
government controlled entities buying shares in other nations’
corporations.
51
At a minimum, large corporations can be influential and, if
under the influence or control of a foreign government, can promote a
state’s interest.
52
47. See Jonathan Soble, Why the U.S. Fears a Chinese Bid for Westinghouse Electric,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/business/us-china-toshiba
-westinghouse.html?_r=0 (“Westinghouse is believed to have been targeted by Chinese
spies. If a Chinese entity were to buy the company, China could obtain secrets without the
cloak and dagger.”).
48. Julien Chaisse, Demystifying Public Security Exception and Limitations on Capital
Movement: Hard Law, Soft Law and Sovereign Investments in the EU Internal Market, 37
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 583, 594 (2015).
49. See Larry Catá Backer, The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational Law:
Non-State Enterprises in Polycentric Asymmetric Global Orders, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 17
(2016) (arguing that corporations can be deployed to advance state goals).
50. See Steven T. Kargman, Venezuela Needs Debt Restructuring, INT’L ECON., Fall
2018, at 58, 61, http://www.kargmanassociates.com/Venezuelan/Venezuelan_Debt_Res tru
cturing.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ35-XPBR] (“Both China and Russia may, however, have
broader non-financial considerations at play when considering how much more deeply to get
involved in Venezuela on a financial basis. They may weigh possible considerations such
as advancing their geopolitical/strategic objectives, establishing or expanding a footprint
(whether commercial/economic, military, or otherwise) in Latin America, securing long-
term supplies of natural resources, and so forth.”).
51. See Toby Sterling, Tim Hepher & Sudip Kar-Gupta, Air France-KLM Shares Slump
on Surprise Dutch Stake Buy, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
netherlands-air-france-klm/air-france-klm-shares-slump-on-surprise-dutch-stake-buy-idUSK
CN1QG0XM [https://perma.cc/66TX-P6PU] (“Shares in Air France-KLM fell sharply as
the Dutch government amassed a 14 percent stake in the airline to counter French influence,
in a surprise move highlighting tensions over the company’s strategic direction.”).
52. See Rachel Brewster & Philip J. Stern, Introduction to the Proceedings of the
Seminar on Corporations and International Law, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 413, 420
(2018), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article
=1526&context=djcil [https://perma.cc/MX9B-YBYJ] (“[L]arge multinational corporations
may have greater expertise in understanding international law, particularly as compared to
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Such concerns are magnified with respect to China since China’s
economic model is innately different than the Western model. In China,
“manifestation of the party-state in its role as controlling shareholder” is of
critical importance.
53
The Chinese government is directly involved in all
economic sectors; state capitalism is manifested in the dominance of
government-controlled businesses. In most, if not all Chinese corporations,
CCP members are embedded in the management of the business.
54
Chinese government control of its economy remains sweeping
and is increasing rather than fading away. An economic plan
outlined by President Xi reserves the “ . . . Communist Party of
China leadership over all forms of work in China.” . . . [T]he
assets controlled by the hundred largest centrally administered
Chinese state-owned enterprises have risen sharply to $10.4
trillion—a more than ten-fold increase since 2003. The total
value of China’s 51,000 state owned enterprises is about $29.2
trillion, according to the OECD. For comparison, the annual
GDP of the United States in 2017 was about $19.4 trillion.
55
Governmental ownership is also fundamentally different than being
controlled by private economic actors. Businesses will naturally seek to
obtain the favor of a powerful entity which wields the power to prosecute,
grant waivers, lobby other nations, and design subsidies. Thus, there is a
real risk that a corporation may seek advantage by advancing the interest of
the state.
[E]xtensive state intervention in the economy, weak formal
institutions to check state power, and the pervasive influence of
developing states, and use this expertise as a means of resisting and reshaping global
regulatory development.”).
53. Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bonded to the State: A Network Perspective on
China’s Corporate Debt Market, 3 J. FIN. REG. 1, 15 (2017).
54. See also infra notes 106–108 and accompanying text (discussing how even an
ostensibly private business such as Huawei may in fact be controlled by the Chinese
government).
55. Greg Mastel, China Without a Private Sector, INT’L ECON., Spring 2019, at 8, 46, ht
tp://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Sp19_Mastel.pdf. But see Bloomberg News, No
More Bailouts? China’s New Approach to Bank Stress, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2019, 8:06
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/no-more-bailouts-chinas-new-approach-to-
bank-stress/2019/08/09/08170e20-ba5d-11e9-8e83-4e6687e99814_story.html [https://perma
.cc/67JU-3BTZ] (“Several lenders have fallen into deep trouble this year, with others --
perhaps many -- expected to follow. What’s different is that China seems to have thrown
out the old playbook of injecting state funds into struggling lenders to keep them alive. If
that proves to be the case, it would represent another shift for the country toward more
market-oriented practices.”) (emphasis added).
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the Communist Party—encourages all firms to seek rents from
the state by cultivating ties to party and government organs and
by aligning their business models with the policy objectives of the
Party-state.
56
In addition, the raison d’être of the Chinese state-owned enterprise
(SOE) is the advancement of the CCP’s objectives, thus amplifying the
customary “state-ownership” concerns: “SOEs are exactly established to
execute national strategic goals.”
57
Therefore, concerns regarding the true
motivation of Chinese buyers has increased in recent years. Illustrating this
concern was Canada’s blocking of a Chinese investment based upon this
factor.
Intelligence agencies in both Canada and the USA have warned
that companies owned or partly owned by the Chinese
government are not merely profit-seeking operations; they are
also prone to passing on information or technology to
Beijing and making business decisions that could conflict with
Canadian interests but serve the agenda of the authoritarian
Communist Party of China.
58
Moreover, while Western nations have been attempting to lower
governmental profiles in the economy, China is moving in a different
direction. Notwithstanding Western demands to reform China’s
governance model by reducing the state’s role, state-control is increasing
and CCP representatives are increasingly embedded inside presumably
private corporate actors.
59
Claims that an ostensibly private market actor,
56. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 53, at 22 (emphasis added).
57. See Qingjiang Kong, Emerging Rules in International Investment Instruments and
China’s Reform of State-owned Enterprises, 3 CHINESE J. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 57, 73
(2017) (“SOEs are exactly established to execute national strategic goals.”).
58. Robert Fife & Steven Chase, Trudeau Cabinet Blocks Chinese Takeover of Aecon
over National Security Concerns, GLOBE&MAIL (May 23, 2018), https://www.theglobeand
mail.com/politics/article-ottawa-blocks-chinese-takeover-of-aecon-over-national-security/
[https://perma.cc/9XTZ-8D2P] (emphasis added).
59. See Frank Tang, China Ignoring US Demand for Trade War Reform by Reinforcing
State-directed Economic Model, SOUTH CHINAMORNING POST (July 13, 2019, 8:30 PM), htt
ps://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3018120/china-ignoring-us-demandtra
de-war-reform-reinforcing-state [https://perma.cc/RZV4-9RHH] (“The consolidation of
state-owned enterprises has also touched local government-owned firms, especially those in
resources, port and overcapacity industries. In the first half of this year, controlling stakes
in at least four listed firms, including Hainan Strait Shipping and Maanshan Iron & Steel,
have been shifted from local governments to the SASAC. Also on Monday, filmmaker
Huayi Brothers Media joined the growing ranks of leading private firms that have set up
Communist Party cells within their organisations. Similar party organs have been
established in more than 1.5 million non-public corporations nationwide, official data
showed.”).
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Huawei, is not subject to governmental control have been questioned.
60
In
addition to “pure” national security related concerns, traditional corporate
governance concerns also exist with governmental share ownership and are
inter-related to security issues.
B. Corporate Governance Concerns
China’s corporate governance model shares some similarities with
Western models. For example, Chinese law requires independent
directors,
61
and businesses are encouraged to make a profit. Therefore, in a
sense, China’s model may be considered simply another version of
governance. After all, “[t]here’s not just one market economy model. It is
even different among developed countries. . . .”
62
However, China’s model is inherently different from the model in
Western nations since, as noted above, the state is often the controlling or
dominant stakeholder. “This Party-state-centric networking phenomenon,
in our view, is a distinguishing characteristic of Chinese state capitalism.”
63
And controlling ownership is a fundamentally transformative concept in
corporate governance. Controlling owners may directly lead to control-
agency conflicts or extraction of corporate knowledge that impinges on
national security. A controlling owner’s self-interest may collide with the
interest of minority shareholders and significantly impact the directors’ and
managers’ decisions. This is no different than a controlling owner
engaging in conduct that benefits the controlling shareholder at the expense
of the minority shareholders or other stakeholders. The extraction of
benefits which are substantially more advantageous to the controlling
owner is an endemic governance problem.
Significant shareholders may reap significant secondary awards, such
as close communications with senior executives and directors, visits to a
60. See infra notes 106–108 and accompanying text (discussing whether Huawei is
subject to government control).
61. Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of
Listed Companies, CHINA SEC. REG. COMMISSION art. I(3) (Aug. 16, 2001), http://www.csrc.
gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.html [https://perma.cc/U8
RA-Q2W9] (“All domestically listed companies shall make necessary amendments to the
articles of association in accordance with the requirements set in the Guidelines and appoint
qualified persons to be independent directors.”).
62. See Tang, supra note 59 (“Li Yiping, a professor of economics at Renmin
University, defended China’s growth model, saying it already had characteristics in
common with market economies, including corporate entities with clear ownership, market
mechanisms that played a decisive role in resource allocation, and a role for government to
provide necessary public services and development guidance.”)
63. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 53, at 33.
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corporation and product demonstrations—all manifestations of a classic
control-agency corporate governance issue.
64
The ability to elect directors,
direct corporate affairs, and extract proprietary information can be used to
further a foreign government’s interests.
For profit-seeking controlling shareholders, it is all about prioritizing
their own economic interests. But controlling, foreign-government
shareholders may be interested in prioritizing the state’s interests.
Significantly, prioritizing the state usually does not lead to superior
financial results.
65
[D]espite the fact that [privately-owned enterprises] are more
profitable than the state-owned/linked issuers . . . [p]roceeds of
bond issues by state-owned/linked issuers have been used largely
to finance construction, real estate, infrastructure, and mining.
Bond issues by [privately-owned enterprises] have financed a
broader spectrum of industrial sectors. . . . The regulatory
competition that has partially fuelled explosive growth in bond
issues, therefore, has principally benefitted state actors.
66
Corruption at government-owned and controlled entities is known to
lead to inefficiencies and a lack of productivity. Government-owned
corporations are known to be inefficient, distort economic performance and
create financial instability risks. “Recent experience has shown that State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) can be an important source of concerns in at
least three areas: market functioning, public finances and financial
64. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Majority Control and Minority Protection, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 450 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (noting the numerous benefits that accrue to important
shareholders).
65. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 53, at 33–34 (“The state capitalist approach has
fostered tremendous growth in the issuance of corporate debt instruments, but it is not
obvious that the consequences are favourable for China. The very entities that are
underserved by the banking system and equity markets—POEs and SMEs—have benefitted
the least from development of the corporate bond market. Instead, benefits have
disproportionately flowed to the state sector: in fact, the principal role of the corporate bond
market has been to supplement the loan market as a privileged financing channel for SOEs.
It has played this role by providing even lower cost financing to SOEs than is available in
the loan market and by creating a means of circumventing bank lending limits to favoured
SOE borrowers. Meanwhile, the rapidly developing shadow banking system (discussed
below), illustrates the limitations of the corporate debt market as a financing channel for
SMEs. In short, instead of developing a competitive bond market with diverse products
serving multiple classes of credit-worthy issuers, the Chinese government’s approach has
been to prioritize SOE interests in a tightly managed market that is simultaneously massive
in scale and seriously underdeveloped institutionally.”).
66. Id. at 22–23.
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stability.”
67
Generally, state-owned or controlled entities are beset with a lack of
productivity and endemic corruption.
68
For example, persistent corruption
issues in Brazilian SOEs highlight the risk of governmental involvement in
private corporations.
69
Thus, the potential problems when the state is a
large investor are not just national security; there are traditional, corporate
governance conflicts of interest as in any corporation with a dominant or
controlling shareholder. There is widespread agreement that EU SOEs
must be reformed to address general governance problems, market
inefficiencies and risks to economic stability. China itself has
acknowledged the crucial need to reform its inefficient SOEs.
70
Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that foreign-government
shareholders will not leverage their holdings to transfer technology to their
home governments, poor corporate governance by itself risks financial
stability and constitutes a threat to national security.
71
Financial stability is
a crucial objective of sovereigns, and lackluster corporate governance
presents a serious risk to financial stability.
72
67. EUROPEAN COMM’N, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN THE EU: LESSONS LEARNT AND
WAYS FORWARD IN A POST-CRISIS CONTEXT 5 (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/file
s/file_import/ip031_en_2.pdf. [https://perma.cc/EV4N-MNS9]
68. See Steven T. Kargman, Venezuelan Debt Conundrum, Int’l Econ., Spring 2019, at
38, http://kargmanassociates.com/TIE(Spring’19)--S.Kargman--VenezuelanDebtConundru
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/F245-9E6L] (discussing the dismissal of professional managers at a
Venezuelan SOE, their replacement with politically connected personnel and the resulting
severe adverse effects on the business).
69. See MARCELO PADUA LIMA ET AL., GLOBAL LAW - LEGAL ANSWERS FOR CONCRETE
CHALLENGES 122 (Maria Lucia Labate Mantovanini Padua Lima & José Garcez Ghirardi
eds., 2018) (using Petrobras as an example of corruption issues in SOEs and stating that
“supplier firms and operators in the Petrobras drilling process ‘coincidentally’ have as
shareholders some of the same construction & contractor enterprises”).
70. See Wendy Leutert, Challenges Ahead in China’s Reform of State-Owned
Enterprises, 21 ASIA POL’Y 83, 86 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2
016/07/Wendy-Leutert-Challenges-ahead-in-Chinas-reform-ofstateowned-enterprises.pdf [h
ttps://perma.cc/AUG3-6HEC] (“The Xi Jinping administration has identified the reform of
state-owned enterprises (SOE) as an essential step in the structural transformation of
China’s economy.”).
71. Good corporate governance is essential for financial stability.
72. See Guido Ferrarini, Understanding the Role of Corporate Governance in Financial
Institutions: A Research Agenda 15 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
347/2017, 2017), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/347-2017.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2YEC-MFRV] (“Governments and regulators rely on corporate
governance as a complement to financial supervision, which explains why regulation is on
the rise in this area. In brief, regulation requires boards of directors and their risk
committees to oversee the undertaking and management of risks by financial institutions.
Board members of financial institutions are subject to regulatory duties, which specify their
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The serious risk to financial stability is exemplified by a “mountain of
bad loans” on the books of China’s state-owned banks which is
proximately caused by China’s state-capitalism corporate governance.
73
China’s banks may have a flood of bad loans waiting in the
wings. Not that you’d know it from looking at official levels for
2018, which suggest the problem was broadly contained. The
reality is that newly soured debt was coming through the front
door as fast as banks could shovel it out the back.
74
The potential scale of the problem is staggering:
China’s central bank, concluding its first review into industry
risks, said in November that about one in 10 of the nation’s 4,000
banks received a “fail” rating. . . . Jason Bedford, a UBS Group
AG analyst who had flagged the problems at Baoshang and
Jinzhou, says China’s smaller banks face a potential capital
shortfall of 2.4 trillion yuan ($340 billion). He estimates the size
of assets “in distress” held by a broader universe of Chinese
lenders at 9.2 trillion yuan -- about 4% of the commercial
banking system and nearly 10% of gross domestic product.
75
Being foreign government controlled entities, state-owned banks may
implement the foreign government’s interest of providing credit even if the
borrowers should not have qualified. Losses at state-owned banks may be
tolerated as a trade-off to advance a governmental interest. In contrast,
such losses would be unacceptable in a profit-seeking governance
architecture.
Chinese lenders are sitting on more than 2 trillion yuan ($295
billion) of soured loans after flooding the financial system with
cheap credit for years to prop up economic growth. . . . Bad loans
may keep piling up as the government pushes banks to lend more
to risky small and private businesses to reinvigorate the
monitoring tasks and the ways in which they should perform the same in the interest of
financial stability.”).
73. See Christopher Balding, China’s Banks Have a Hidden Wave of Bad Debt,
STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019, 9:52 AM), https://www.straitstimes.com/business/banking/c
hinas-banks-have-a-hidden-wave-of-bad-debt [https://perma.cc/SLR2-DYK4] (“These
issues may require backstopping by the People’s Bank of China to succeed. The central
bank last month swapped 1.5 billion yuan of its one-year bills for perpetual bonds, the first
use of a new tool aimed at increasing market acceptance of the securities and encouraging
commercial lenders to sell more.”).
74. Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, official disclosures may be subject to nuanced
“massaging” for either domestic or global consumption.
75. Bloomberg News, supra note 55.
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economy.
76
If a foreign government invests in the financial services sector and has
a motivation to direct loans to borrowers that ordinarily do not qualify,
financial stability is at risk. There is a real risk of some lenders becoming
“wiped out” as a result of unwise lending practices. Indeed, the risk of
allowing China’s banks to cause financial instability has led China to
increasingly intervene.
77
“[E]arly last year . . . all lenders were forced to
reclassify loans overdue for more than 90 days as non-performing. The
move soon led to a record quarterly surge in soured debt and wiped-
out capital at some small lenders.”
78
And while China’s regulators recognize the moral hazards of state
capitalism,
79
China is reluctant, for good reason, to allow market forces to
cause severe damage to financial stability, underscoring that stability is a
national security issue.
80
By no means is this a criticism of China. Western
nations are also grappling with moral-hazard questions. Even the United
States, the quintessential shareholder-value private market model, has
engaged in state capitalism. For example, to avoid a collapse of “TBTF”
81
76. China to Impose Stricter Policy on Bad-Loan Recognition, BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2019), htt
ps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-06/china-is-said-to-impose-stricter-policy-
on-bad-loan-recognition [https://perma.cc/57FX-8P6Y] [hereinafter China to Impose
Stricter Policy].
77. See China to Buy Stake in Another Troubled Regional Bank: Report, BUS. TIMES
(Aug. 9, 2019, 1:55 PM), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/banking-finance/china-to-buy-
stake-in-another-troubled-regional-bank-report [https://perma.cc/H59C-Y25X] (“If
confirmed, it would be the third rescue of a regional lender engineered by authorities in less
than three months. Hengfeng, based in China’s Shandong province, declined to
immediately comment.”).
78. China to Impose Stricter Policy, supra note 76.
79. See Shuli Ren, Why China Has Chickened Out of Another Bank Seizure,
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2019, 11:19 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-
07-29/why-china-has-chickened-out-of-another-bank-rescue [https://perma.cc/D9FU-5H6R]
(“The PBOC tried to do the right thing with the Baoshang takeover. But now, fearful of
market jitters, the central bank is chickening out. Instead, China has resorted to the old trick
of a national team rescue, which does little to break the implicit guarantee of state
support.”); see also Nathaniel Taplin, Another Month, Another Chinese Bank Bailout, WALL
ST. J. (July 26, 2019, 8:12 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/another-month-another-chines
e-bank-bailout-11564142953 (“To calm things down, the central bank not only injected
massive amounts of cash into the banking system but also walked back its initial tough
stance. A central bank-affiliated newspaper reported that 99.98% of Baoshang’s corporate
creditors were being fully repaid.”).
80. See Taplin, supra note 79 (“Beijing dislikes bailing out state companies—
particularly banks—but can’t seem to kick the habit.”).
81. See Eric Dash, If It’s Too Big to Fail, Is It Too Big to Exist?, N.Y. TIMES (June 20,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/weekinreview/21dash.html?partner=rss&em
c=rss (describing how the term “too big to fail” was coined in the 1980s to argue that the
480 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:2
American banks and prevent contagion of financial instability, the U.S.
entered the financial markets to rescue important financial institutions.
82
Free-market economies are certainly subject to the fluctuations and
systemic risk of a free market, but there is no reason to add an additional
threat to financial stability. Wide-scale, foreign-sovereign ownership of
financial services institutions poses financial stability risks not merely from
a national security standpoint, but from the potential misdirection and
instability caused by poor corporate governance. If foreign-government
buyers can influence financial institutions to make business decisions that
benefit endemically under-performing state actors, then there is a
substantial risk to financial stability.
IV. FOREIGNGOVERNMENT INVESTORS
Foreign government controlled sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are
major stock market investors and have the capacity to control large swaths
of economic activity. SWFs are already buying shares in publicly traded
companies. “CIC invests in a wide range of financial products globally,
including public equity, fixed income, alternative assets and cash and
others. Public equity refers to equity investment in listed companies.”
83
Banks and other vital financial services enterprises, such as
investment banks, are attractive targets of foreign adversaries.
Nation states, either directly or working through proxy actors,
have already demonstrated a willingness and capability to target
global financial services infrastructure. North Korean cyber
attacks against the financial sector, for instance, are highly
connected to the U.S. sanctions regime; Pyongyang has
circumvented sanctions and funded its nuclear program through,
among other things, a series of heists using SWIFT, a global
messaging system, against the Bank of Bangladesh in
2016 and Taiwan’s Far Eastern Bank in 2017. The Iranian DDoS
attacks against the U.S. financial sector between 2011 and 2013
and the North Korean attack against South Korean banks in
2013 are other notable examples. Beyond criminal entities, the
government must prevent a bank—if it is too large—to fail and therefore damage the wider
economy).
82. Such as Citibank, AIG, and auto companies. See also Joel Slawotsky, Reining in
Recidivist Financial Institutions, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 280 (2015) (discussing reasons such as
the revolving door, little risk of prison and profits dwarfing the fines imposed as
encouraging reckless conduct).
83. Portfolio Structure, CHINA INV. CORP., http://www.china-inv.cn/chinainven/Investm
ents/Portfolio_Management.shtml [https://perma.cc/NL7D-NGRM].
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actors targeting financial institutions are highly capable states,
such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, or proxy actors
enabled by these governments.
84
As an alternative to cyber-attacks, foreign states may opt to gain a
foothold in the banking sector, thus providing extraordinary leverage and
potential influence in another economy. By controlling financial services
companies as shareholders, states can direct lending activities towards
certain sectors and can have influence over significant sums of capital.
Moreover, “the reality is that U.S. banks, in many respects, are already
enforcement arms of U.S. foreign policy.”
85
Major shareholders are
empowered to elect directors who in turn hire the officers. It would be
sensible to presume that legal due diligence with respect to foreign
sovereign shareholders may be lackluster at best and at worst stonewalled.
This may simply be a corporate governance conflict of interest. One need
only examine the repeated serial misconduct of financial institutions to
appreciate that engaging in illegal activities such as money laundering, if
directed or encouraged by significant shareholders, is a reasonably likely
occurrence.
86
Furthermore, the risk that foreign government shareholders
may seek to influence a U.S. financial institution is probable given the
global nature of many such institutions (i.e., these financial services
companies have operations overseas and may need the goodwill of foreign
governments). It is one thing to seek the good graces of a government and
quite another when that government’s representatives are in key corporate
positions.
State-owned foreign banks have already expanded overseas by
investing in financial institutions located in other jurisdictions. “Chinese
banks established themselves in the country or acquired shares of Brazilian
or international banks already operating in Brazil.”
87
Over the long-term, foreign sovereign control over companies through
influence, election of directors or shareholder activism can substantially
84. Borghard, supra note 10.
85. Id.
86. See Slawotsky, supra note 82, at 316 (“The criminal behavior of the financial
services industry is not limited to a specific area of misconduct. To the contrary, corrupt
behavior is widespread and envelops a wide array of conduct. Iconic financial institutions
involved in serious wrongdoing include: JPMorgan ($13 billion); BNP ($10 billion);
Citigroup ($7 billion); HSBC ($1.9 billion); Standard Chartered ($667 million); ING ($619
million); Credit Suisse ($536 million); Lloyds TSB Group ($350 million); and Barclays
($298 million).”).
87. CHINA-BRAZ. BUS. COUNCIL, CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN BRAZIL 8 (2017), https://ww
w.cebc.org.br/sites/default/files/investimentoschinesesnobrasil2016_en.pdf. [https://perma.c
c/YR48-5LPW]
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impact the host nation.
88
“States and corporations are now capable of
deploying forces in the field—sometimes states hire corporations that serve
as mercenary armies that protect its own operations as well as those of the
institutions of the state from sub-national and supra-state threats.”
89
Shared ownership of critical corporations by foreign governments
enables foreign governments to exercise influence and possible control
over another state, or alternatively at a minimum, become embedded in
vital economic sectors. Deployment of corporate power is a potential
security threat inasmuch as domestic financial stability, technological
prowess, and critical industries can be threatened. Therefore, corporate
share ownership and national security are now inextricably linked.
Further incentivizing foreign governmental share purchases, the
acquisition of shares on the open market is generally “quieter” than media
announcements of a full take-over, a joint venture or a large private
investment. For example, China’s Ant Financial sought to buy
MoneyGram in a large transaction,
90
but the deal was blocked by CFIUS on
national security concerns. But Ant was able to, and indeed did acquire,
small stakes in global companies which jointly may result in significant
foreign influence in the global financial services sector.
91
The
accumulation of shares may in fact be completely without notice,
particularly if, for example, the number of shares is below the reporting
threshold of a sovereign’s securities regulations. As such, buying shares as
opposed to large deals or ventures—which are likely to be scrutinized—is
likely to become more common.
Conversely, control and ownership of important corporations can also
88. Larry C. Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Rule of
Law Building: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 1, 92–94 (2013); see also Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging
Superpowers: How U.S. Regulators Should Respond, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1255 (2009)
(discussing ways in which sovereign wealth funds pursue shareholder activism).
89. Catá Backer, supra note 49, at 50.
90. See Greg Roumeliotis, U.S. Blocks MoneyGram Sale to China’s Ant Financial on
National Security Concerns, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2018, 3:36 PM), https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-moneygram-intl-m-a-ant-financial/u-s-blocks-moneygram-sale-to-chinas-ant-financia
l-on-national-security-concerns-idUSKBN1ER1R7 [https://perma.cc/J4G7-Y34Z] (“The
MoneyGram deal is the latest in a string of Chinese acquisitions of U.S. companies that
have failed to clear CFIUS.”).
91. See John Jannarone, China’s Ant Financial to Buy $100 Million of Brazil’s Stone
Shares After IPO, YAHOO FIN. (Oct. 22, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-ant-fi
nancial-buy-100-203140637.html [https://perma.cc/62TQ-ANEV] (“Chinese fintech firm
Ant Financial has agreed to buy $100 million of shares in Brazilian digital-payments
company StoneCo (ticker: STNE), adding to a list of high-profile buyers that have taken
interest in the IPO slated to price this week at a valuation of up to $6.2 billion.”).
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be used defensively; a state’s purchase of shares can be a measure
employed to thwart losing industrial and technological superiority, or to
defend economic strength.
92
In one example, the Finish Government—
through a sovereign investment fund—acquired a stake in Finnish national
champion Nokia.
93
In another example, Germany is planning to acquire stakes in national
industrial champions.
Germany could take stakes in companies to prevent foreign
takeovers in some key technology areas, Economy Minister Peter
Altmaier said on Tuesday, presenting a new industrial strategy he
said was necessary for the country’s cohesion. The pivot to a
more defensive industrial policy is driven by German concerns
about foreign—particularly Chinese—companies acquiring
German know-how and eroding the manufacturing base on which
much of Germany’s prosperity is built.
94
Governments are likely to increase investments in stock markets as the
nascent hegemonic rivalry becomes increasingly linked to economic and
technological supremacy, both as an offensive tactic as well as defensive
tool.
Therefore, a vital issue arising from the intersection of national
security and publicly traded shares is to what extent sovereigns wish to
limit other nations’ investments in domestic stock markets and whether a
lower threshold of disclosure can identify such investments. This
heightened concern over shareholder ownership needs to be balanced so as
to avoid protectionism and limiting the ability of domestic businesses to
attract investment capital. However, in light of the hegemonic rivalry and
burgeoning national security concerns, updating regulations is an essential
defensive measure taken to thwart losing industrial and technological
superiority.
95
92. See Reuters, Germany Ready to Buy Stakes in Automakers, Other Companies to
Protect Them, AUTOBLOG (Feb. 5, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.autoblog.com/2019/02 /05/g
ermany-buy-stakes-automakers-protection/ [https://perma.cc/96MC-2HAN] (discussing how
Germany is acquiring shares to prevent a foreign government from controlling
corporations).
93. Finnish Government Buys Stake in Nokia, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018, 12:41 PM), ht
tps://www.ft.com/content/8a6741b8-26a9-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 [https://perma.cc/2Z Y
4-PN43].
94. Reuters, supra note 92.
95. See Sterling, Hepher & Kar-Gupta, supra note 51 (“Shares in Air France-KLM fell
sharply as the Dutch government amassed a 14 percent stake in the airline to counter French
influence, in a surprise move highlighting tensions over the company’s strategic direction.”).
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V. UPDATING SECURITIESREGULATION: DISCLOSURE OFOWNERSHIP
While envisaged as enabling the free flow of transparent information
and informing company management and market regulators, the disclosure
regime can now also serve to alert sovereigns of threats to national security.
Militating strongly in favor of heightened disclosure is the fact that it is
plausible that foreign government ownership of publicly traded shares is
vastly underestimated. Many shareholdings are unknown and undisclosed.
“Importantly, the available figures underestimate the true size and scope of
China’s ambitions in Europe . . . [N]ot included: greenfield developments
or stock-market operations totaling at least $40 billion. . . .”
96
In many jurisdictions a buyer must disclose the acquisition of 4.9% of
the shares of a public company.
97
For example, in the United States, the
Williams Act obligates disclosure of a 4.9% holding within 10 days and
was designed to “close a significant gap in investor protection under the
Federal securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent
information.”
98
Interestingly, the background to this statute was in fact
concern over a foreign buyer seeking shares in domestic U.S.
corporations.
99
To evade U.S. filings, foreign governmental entities could buy small
96. Andre Tartar, Mira Rojanasakul & Jeremy Scott Diamond, How China Is Buying Its
Way Into Europe, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-
china-business-in-europe/ [https://perma.cc/G7KF-86JS] (emphasis added).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018) (requiring public disclosure upon ownership of 5%
of a public company’s shares); see also OECD, DISCLOSURE OF BENEFICIALOWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL IN LISTED COMPANIES IN ASIA (2016), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Disclosure-Be
neficial-Ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/B983-WCDF] (stating that numerous nations,
including in Asia, have the 5% rule). Compare Jeffrey Roberts, UK Shareholder Activism: A
Toolbox for 2014, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE&FIN. REG. (Mar. 2, 2014), http
s://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/03/02/uk-shareholder-activism-a-toolbox-for-2014/ [https:
//perma.cc/V8AX-VG5S] (describing the UK’s requirements of 3% or 5%), with ISRAELI
GOV’T, SELF ASSESSMENT ACCORDING TO METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OECD PRINCIPLES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2008), http://ww
w.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile_7411.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2X9-JSB] (describing Israel’s
5% requirement), and ALLENS, THE ALLENS HANDBOOK ON TAKEOVERS IN AUSTRALIA
(2019), https://www.allens.com.au/globalassets/pdfs/sectors-services/ma/takeovers-handboo
k.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B2J-59GZ] (describing Australia’s 5% requirement).
98. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
99. Mariana Pargendler, The Grip of Nationalism on Corporate Law 31 (ECGI
Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 437/2019, 2019), https://ecgi.global/sites
/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalpargendler1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7NS-SQ
HM] (“It is revealing, however, that the enactment of the Williams Act of 1968—the only
piece of U.S. federal legislation targeting hostile takeovers to date—had the foreign
takeover threat against Columbia Motion Pictures as its poster child for the perils of
unregulated acquisition markets.”).
2020] FINANCIAL STABILITY ANDNATIONAL SECURITY 485
stakes in companies—essentially flying under the radar—and acquire less
than 4.9% of the shares without reporting.
100
Furthermore, modest share
purchases among several like-minded foreign governmental entities could,
when combined, present an intriguing method of acquiring a dominant or
even controlling influence over a publicly traded company.
Generally, the regulatory response is to treat buyers working as a
“group” jointly. Accordingly, two or more persons who have agreed to act
together are treated as a single purchaser and their several ownership stakes
are aggregated.
101
Thus, two foreign governmental entities individually
owning 2.5% will be obligated to file a disclosure statement if they are
working together as a group.
102
The controlling inquiry in determining
whether a group is formed is whether two or more parties acted in concert
with the specific “purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of
securities.”
103
Notwithstanding the fact a group may be found even if no
formal agreement is created,
104
foreign government buyers are likely to
100. But see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2018); 17 C.F.R. 240.13f (2018) (stating that all
institutional investment managers of funds in excess of $100 million are subject to the
disclosure provisions of section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act, which requires
quarterly disclosure of major holdings.) However, 13F is not always relevant nor adhered
to. See, e.g., David Barboz & Keith Bradsher, China Lists $9.6 Billion in Shares of U.S.
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/business/glob
al/09invest.html [https://perma.cc/V2H8-SXJT] (reporting that Chinese SWF did not report
on 13F until 2010). In addition, in some nations the lack of transparency may result in
creative structuring enabling investment managers to “manage less than $100 million,”
thereby obviating the 13F disclosure requirement. Yet even more significantly, 13F is only
applicable to institutional managers—mutual funds, hedge funds, trust companies, pension
funds, insurance companies and registered investment advisers. If the foreign governmental
entity buying the shares is not one of these types of managers (i.e., it is an ordinary
business), the 13F disclosure is irrelevant.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2018) (“When two or more persons act as a partnership,
limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a ‘person’ for
the purposes of this subsection.”).
102. Id.; see also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance 28–38 (Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies,
Colum. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 521, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap
ers.cfm?abstract_id=2656325 [http://perma.cc/EJT2- 8PFX] (discussing “wolf-pack” tactics
and stating that “if three ‘persons’ each acquire 2% of the stock in a target company and
their relationship makes them a ‘group’, their shares are aggregated by Section 13(d), which
treats them as a single ‘person’ who must file a Schedule 13D”).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2018); see also CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt.
(UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]wo or more entities do not become a
group within the meaning of section 13(d)(3) unless they ‘act as a . . . group for the purpose
of acquiring . . . securities of an issuer.’”)
104. CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 283–84 (holding that without evidence supporting that
members of the alleged group reached an understanding for the specific “purpose of either
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employ sophisticated legal avoidance tactics with counsel advising how to
avoid the trappings of forming a “group.”
Another tactic to evade “group action” is by imitating hedge fund and
other activist investors in conduct known as wolf-pack investing.
105
Wolf-
pack investing has become a routine stratagem, particularly by hedge
funds, to take on a stake and obtain transformational corporate changes,
including the break-up of a company. The tactic is a successful model
where similar-minded institutions do not conspire, but often acquire stakes
in a company in the same general time frame in order to extract benefits for
themselves. Foreign governmental investors might engage in this conduct
as well. Wolf-pack investing could potentially be employed for strategic
motivations as well (i.e., diminishing the relative strength of a rival’s
industrial or technological sector). While wolf-pack investing is
permissible under existing securities regulation, the injection of national
security is a factor that may alter the legality of multiple government
investors so acting. This potential should be addressed by securities
regulators.
A. Defining Foreign Governmental Investors
A crucial preliminary issue is defining the trigger for “control” for
purposes of securities regulation. How should control be conceptualized
when the share buyer is potentially a foreign government controlled entity?
The question is complicated given some jurisdictions’ lack of transparency
or different conceptualizations of ownership. Private corporations may in
fact be under the ultimate influence and direction of a foreign government.
In addition, there may simply be a lack of disclosure in home nations, thus
clouding the true structure. Alternatively, there may be intentional
obfuscation and evasion. Therefore, bright line tests may constitute an
ineffective marker of foreign governmental control.
A foreign government owned entity may be one with even a relatively
modest percentage of share ownership or even “zero” share ownership.
Indeed, with respect to China for example, “the majority share of state is
not a determinative factor as to the ‘meaningful control’ of the government
acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of securities[,]” it will be difficult to prove a group
has been formed).
105. See Joel Slawotsky, Hedge Fund Activism in an Age of Global Collaboration and
Financial Innovation: The Need for a Regulatory Update of United States Disclosure Rules,
35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 275, 279 (2015) (describing hedge fund activism via wolf-pack
investing).
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and much less to the requirement of ‘governmental authority.’”
106
Illustrative of the problematic nature of understanding the ownership
structure of foreign corporations is Huawei, whose shares are not publicly
traded and therefore is ostensibly a purely private market actor. Huawei
states that “Huawei is an independent, privately-held company. We are not
owned or controlled by, nor affiliated with the government, or any other
3rd party corporation.”
107
Yet Huawei’s connections to the Chinese Government are
unquestionable.
108
Whether those ties result in control is certainly a
plausible scenario. Although Huawei’s shares are evidently 100% owned
by a holding company, the holding company is 1% owned by Huawei’s
founder and 99% owned by a trade union committee which may simply be
a proxy for, or in fact, a government organ. “Given the public nature of
trade unions in China, if the ownership stake of the trade union committee
is genuine, and if the trade union and its committee function as trade unions
generally function in China, then Huawei may be deemed effectively state-
owned.”
109
Therefore, defining foreign government control over a buyer may be
more complicated than merely examining the percentage ownership. While
bright-line tests are important, opaque financial disclosures or purposeful
disguising of governmental links may render a narrow set of specific
benchmarks a failed identification system. Regulators will need to review
disclosures (or the lack thereof) of investments in the context of these
factors.
B. Suggested Modifications for Updated Regulation
While addressing all of the issues raised is beyond the scope of this
Article, several suggestions are made with respect to foundational issues.
The key is a balance because attracting investors is crucial to economic
health. Blanket protectionism should be avoided, but naïve policy in which
critical sectors are bound to end up in a foreign adversary or competitor’s
hands risks a potentially disastrous national security violation.
106. Ding, supra note 38, at 179.
107. Who Owns Huawei?, HUAWEI, https://www.huawei.com/en/facts/question-answer/
who-owns-huawei [https://perma.cc/Z8XP-Y6NA] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).
108. Raymond Zhong, Who Owns Huawei? The Company Tried to Explain. It Got
Complicated, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/technology
/who-owns-huawei.html [https://perma.cc/4ZMV-9L2A].
109. Christopher Balding & Donald C. Clarke, Who Owns Huawei? (Apr. 17, 2019), http
s://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372669 [https://perma.cc/RQT6-3MXQ].
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(1) Control needs to be conceptualized as the power to direct a
company either through voting or via another means. Directing the
company is essentially the policy making and implementation of the
business. If the entity’s directors or officers are elected, appointed or need
to be “approved” by a governmental entity or organ, governmental control
exists. As the U.S. SEC has noted, “the fact that officers and directors have
the ability to directly or indirectly influence the management and policies
of an issuer will generally render officers and directors unable to certify to
the requirements” necessary to file as a passive investor.
110
Empowerment to control may arise from a variety of sources, such as
being a director, manager, shareholder, a direct or indirect parent entity, or
by other means being enabled to control, direct, or supervise a business.
Therefore, foreign government owned or controlled entities should be
defined broadly and include any entity with any of the following attributes
constituting control: the extent of direct or indirect government ownership;
government veto power over any transactions; government ability to
appoint any directors, executives, managers of the entity or any other
power that would indicate the reasonable likelihood of governmental
influence and ability to direct the entity. The definition should avoid any
bright-line tests and must be sufficiently broad to be liberally inclusive.
Otherwise, the definition risks easy governmental manipulation to evade
the entity being defined as a foreign government owned or controlled
shareholder.
(2) Securities laws should establish a requirement that any foreign
government owned or controlled entity be required to report share
purchases of 1% or more of any publicly traded company. The disclosure
should be made immediately or within one day of acquisition. This
requirement is designed to be a strict reporting threshold to alert regulators
and national security monitors that a company, or perhaps a specific
industry or economic sector, has been targeted by foreign governments.
The disclosure should at a minimum: identify the name, address and
citizenship, place of organization of the buyer; the amount of the securities
beneficially owned and total beneficial ownership percentage; the source
and amount of funds provided, or any other consideration, financial or
otherwise, used to purchase the shares and disclose whether voting rights
are held solely by the reporting persons or shared with any other party and
identify the same.
110. Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Beneficial
Ownership Reporting, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGECOMMISSION (July 14, 2016), https://www.sec
.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/reg13d-interp.htm [https://perma.cc/C969-6S4F].
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Further disclosure should be mandatory if any material change ensues
to the filed report, including additional purchases of 0.5% of the shares of
the company.
(3) The United States should establish a list of industries, economic
sectors or specific companies for which foreign governmental share
ownership is capped at a specific percentage or possibly banned. For
example, while precluding foreign governmental ownership of defense
contractors may be sensible, a total ban on investing in auto manufacturers
may hinder obtaining vital investment capital. In the latter example,
perhaps limiting each foreign government to a 4% stake, and permitting up
to a 10% total stake by unrelated governments, may offer a more balanced
approach.
(4) A presumption should exist that multiple foreign government
owned buyers from the same nation are acting as a group. This is sensible
inasmuch as the ultimate owner is the same foreign government. A
question arises as to whether the presumption should be rebuttable, and if
so, under what circumstances. Given the sensitive nature of specific
sectors and the fact that some sectors which may not be sensitive might
become so in the future, a prudent approach might be to have the
presumption irrefutable at least with respect to specific sectors.
(5) The United States should issue a rule whereby foreign
governments and government-controlled buyers are required to formally
disclose all public shareholdings on a quarterly basis. This disclosure will
serve to alert regulators and national security agencies of patterns of
ownership in particular companies or economic sectors. This may be
helpful in the context of domestic investment screening regimes, such as
the United States’ CFIUS mechanism. This will also eviscerate the
potential of foreign government share buyers not coming within a
disclosure regime such as the United States’ 13F rule. Regulatory bodies
should also regularly cross-check and exchange information with allied
nations to avoid “stock exchange shopping” whereby foreign adversaries
may seek to gain influence and control in industries and sectors by
investing in jurisdictions with a more lenient regulatory architecture.
VI. CONCLUSION
The overall power of a sovereign is now substantially magnified by
deploying economic might and technological prowess, as opposed to purely
military capabilities. The willingness of nations to enter private markets
and engage in cross-border investment is an important and transformative
dynamic with immense implications. Sovereigns are empowered through
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shareholding to control corporations, and thus “conquer,” or to
substantially influence and control another sovereign’s political
governance, industrial strength and economic future.
Therefore, as control over infrastructure, technology and other crucial
economic sectors may be vested with other states through foreign
government controlled vehicles such as state-owned enterprises or
sovereign wealth funds, business and economics become more inextricably
linked to national security. State-owned entities have already entered the
global markets and, as shareholders, have the potential capacity of
controlling large swaths of economic activity. Over the long-term, foreign
sovereign control over companies through friendly influence or shareholder
activism can substantially impact the host nation. Obtaining economic
leverage and technological prowess over an adversary through share
accumulation and share voting provides a compellingly attractive
alternative (with a potential benefit of profiting from such leverage and
supremacy) to open military confrontation and the costs and risks of loss.
Indeed conquest, once conceptualized as a traditional, military-based
attack involving human soldiers, fighter jets and tanks, is now achievable
through election interference, hacking and cyber-attack on crucial
infrastructure and other technologically based virtual operations without
the need to cross a border. Technology can also play a pivotal role in a
military confrontation. Robot soldiers can potentially replace human
soldiers and physically invade another nation. Viruses could potentially
cause power plants to explode or even cause military arsenals in an enemy
nation to self-destruct. Hacking could enable an adversary to shut down
defenses.
Given that threats to national security are no longer limited to pure
military perils, defending national security will become increasingly
interconnected with developing, controlling and exploiting technological
innovation, as well as preserving domestic financial stability and core
economic strength. Nations will need to evaluate these concerns and
determine whether share ownership by foreign governments poses national
security risks warranting a re-evaluation of shareholding regulation. While
foreign investment review procedures such as the United States’ CFIUS
can serve as important vetting mechanisms, such regimes are focused on
large transactions; share purchases will generally not be on the radar.
Therefore, securities regulation in the United States should be updated
to reflect the transformational developments in emerging technology and
threats to financial stability, both directly and indirectly, implicating
national security concerns particularly in the context of the hegemonic
rivalry. Foreign governmental entities purchasing shares should be more
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strictly monitored to ensure core economic sectors and emergent
technology are protected. Legitimate governmental investors should not
object to heightened disclosure and reporting requirements.
